How do pleasure and displeasure relate to each other? What are the origins of this concessive hedonist response to displeasure? Here is a brief discussion of the sources of pleasure and pain, and the concessive hedonist response to displeasure. The most obvious difference between pleasure and displeasure is their differences in values. However, this distinction does not hold true for every case.
Relationship between pleasure and displeasure
This paper aims to correct the neglect of pleasure and displeasure in the philosophy of mind. It provides a conceptual framework for analyzing pleasure and displeasure and reveals the striking unity of these two phenomena. Furthermore, it reveals how the two phenomena are linked through their determinants. Thus, the present work is a theoretically tractable account of pleasure and displeasure. In addition, it is based on a representationalist framework.
The relationship between pleasure and displeasure has long been an area of debate. Several theories have attempted to explain how pleasure affects the brain. One such theory is that pleasure leads to the production of dopamine, a chemical substance that stimulates the brain’s pleasure centers. However, previous research has found that pleasure is the result of a chemical reaction in the brain, whereas displeasure is a reaction caused by an unpleasant stimulus.
The authors of the present study hypothesized that the relation between pleasure and displeasure was determined by the bi-dimensional sum of the hedonic experience. They used a paired-tailed design to test the theory. The study involved twelve subjects. In each condition, a positive rating indicated pleasure, a negative rating meant displeasure, and a zero was considered indifference. In addition, each subject was allowed to rate the hedonic experience according to his or her own judgment.
Sources of value differences in pleasure and pain
Mill argues that pleasures differ from pains in many ways. These differences include proximity, intensity, and causal connections. According to Mill, physical pleasures are comparatively local and nonlocal, while the opposite is true for pains. One may be more likely to experience pleasure than pain, while another may feel more unpleasant. For example, pleasures involving physical sensations are more pleasurable than pains involving emotional experiences.
A modern utilitarian will point out that pleasure and pain are ambiguous notions. They refer to a variety of agreeable and disagreeable emotions, so the difference in their subjective natures is unclear. Furthermore, it is not true that pleasure is intrinsically good or bad, and vice versa. Instead, they refer to a range of subjective feelings, ranging from mild discomfort to severe pain. A hedonist should avoid the assumption that pleasure or pain are good or bad, since these are both merely the end result of individual action.
Origins of concessive hedonist response to displeasure
The concessive hedonist responds to displeasure in two ways. First, it accepts the case where pleasure is insufficient, and it claims that anything insufficient for value isn’t pleasure. Second, it claims that pleasure is conditionally valuable, which means that it is only valuable if certain conditions are met. This response is especially awkward in the case of self-destructive and masochistic pleasure.
A hedonist responds to counterexamples by constructing competing motivational stories. The soldier was motivated by a belief in a happy afterlife, while the parent acted in good intention with the expectation that doing so would result in pleasure later. A dying non-believer hangs on to life because she thinks that there is pleasure in her life now.
The hedonist may also respond to an anti-necessity objection by arguing that the object is a good only insofar as it is an instance of pleasure. The object of pleasure is a necessary for value, but it’s only an instance of pleasure. This kind of argument is a more plausible response than the first, and hedonists are much more likely to use it when confronted with a non-necessity objection.