If the experience of pleasure is intentional, it follows that the process of experiencing it is intentional. This account is consistent with strong intentionalism, while moderate phenomenalists say that all pleasure is phenomenal. Indeterminate accounts of intentionality are not radical or moderate; they are inconsistent with strong intentionalism, and count against hedonism. A moderate phenomenalist holds that all pleasure is intentional, but is ambivalent about the nature of intentionality.
What does pleasure mean to the mind? How can we understand pleasure, and how does it relate to values? Hedonism about value and intentionality have bearing on these questions. It is important to avoid collapse or reduction of pleasure. Instead, we need a plurality of pleasure-related phenomena that add value. Such phenomenal differences can provide a source of value. However, qualitative hedonists must be careful not to collapse pleasure.
The main goal of this work is to remedy the neglect of pleasure and displeasure in philosophy of mind. The study provides a representationalist account of pleasure and displeasure. It reveals an amazing degree of unity and theoretical tractability between the two phenomena. The theory has two important implications. First, it shows that pleasure signals danger and displeasure acts as a deterrent. In other words, pleasure is a positive emotion and displeasure is a negative emotion.
Secondly, a phenomenal monist view suggests that pleasure has a fundamental character. This element is common to both the feel and tone of pleasure. Broad argues that pleasure carries a positive character, while displeasure involves feeling bad. These considerations help us to identify the core of pleasure and displeasure. We should remember, however, that the existence of both pleasure and displeasure cannot be established in a rigorous way.
The distinction between pleasure and displeasure is important because they are often regarded as mutually exclusive. The circumplex model of affect includes this construct and other types of affect. In this model, pleasure is the core of the emotion, and forms the basis of more elaborate evaluations of pleasure and displeasure. If we can find ways to improve our happiness by experiencing pleasure, we should be able to experience pleasure and displeasure.
Moreover, pleasure and displeasure can be further divided into anticipatory and consummatory phases. However, most existing research on pleasure and displeasure in MDD has focused on the deficiencies in the consummatory phase. Specifically, pleasure is more relevant to exercise psychologists than displeasure, since the same kind of experience can influence motivation. In the present study, participants carried an electronic device and were randomly prompted to rate their satisfaction and displeasure.
Among other things, the concept of pleasure is problematic. Some people claim that pleasure is a mental state that is directly related to the will, while others say that pleasure is an intentional property. However, these accounts are less widely known than the phenomenalist account. However, they do agree on the fact that pleasure is a phenomenological concept. If this is true, the phenomenonlism of pleasure has to be defended as a reality.
Nonetheless, the problem with this account is that there is no common element that makes pleasures alike. Whether a person experiences pleasure because of a particular experience, or because of the particular action, the pleasure is a subjective state that can be categorized as either intentional or phenomenal. Therefore, it is difficult to combine quantitative hedonism and intentionality. It seems that we need to combine the insights of both approaches to make a decision about pleasure and displeasure.
The main objection to hedonism regarding pleasure is the fact that it imply nihilism. This is an obvious, and quite radical, argument that rejects hedonism about value. It is also difficult to overcome. There are other ways to eliminate pleasure. Some individuals are more interested in displeasure than in pleasure. And there are more radical alternatives to eliminating pleasure altogether. Here is one such example: